![]() ![]() This chapter identifies a management problem in the regulation of undercover operations and terms it the problem of “upstream defection” by a “rogue principal,” in contrast to the better-known problem of the faithless agent (known as the “agency problem”) or “downstream defection.” orThe chapter first considers some of the features of undercover operations that bring undercover agents into conflict with investigative teams and supervisors and that can make undercover agents vulnerable to upstream defection, either real or imagined. How Legal Systems Deal with Misalignment among Undercover Agents, Investigators, and Supervisors: Examples from Germany and France Competing Task Environments and the Institutionally Ambiguous Role of Undercover Agents Autonomy and Self-Sacrifice as Risk Factors Malleability of Operational Goals and Performance Indicators Undercover Agents as Bellwethers of Internal Corruption Divergent Levels of Specialization and Expertise A Significant Gulf between Law on the Books and Law in Practice What Features of Undercover Operations Contribute to the Risk of Upstream Defection? Knowing Too Much-The Insider’s Perspective Knowing Too Much-The Outsider’s Perspective Jealousies, Credit Claiming, and Cornering the Market on Rewards What Kinds of “Betrayal” Do Undercover Agents Experience? ![]()
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